Deleted
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Post by Deleted on May 6, 2014 12:40:45 GMT -5
I couldn't find a thread explicitly about this. Seems like it should have its own place. Here's a link to ST founder Shawn Nevins ruminating on it in TAT's Forum (props to sharon for linking to this first) -- he has you step through a simple experiment to test it: There are some interesting wikipedia entries on the subject as well: Neuroscience of Free will -- this points to the Libet experiments also mentioned by Shawn. Basically, it is experimentally observable that the 'awareness' or 'felt intention' to move a finger significantly lagged the brain activity required to move a finger. Perpetually behind the game, folks. But this is not conclusive. compatibilism -- This is the idea that free will and determinism can both be the case. The idea is as Schopenhauer said: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills." The wikipedia entry continues "in other words, although an agent may often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is determined." Dennet argues that free will is essential for the development of morality. That last sentence makes sense to me -- will or motivation is a result of conditioning. It is possible to influence the conditioning that creates the swamp where apparent decisions arise from. But I find a lot of this confusing.
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Goran
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Post by Goran on May 6, 2014 13:08:28 GMT -5
Since we don't decide to decide, we don't have free will. And even if we did decide to decide, did we actually decide that?
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Post by Transcix on May 6, 2014 13:40:59 GMT -5
We DO control our movements, but not explicitly only implicitly, in terms of desire and intent. We absolutely control what we DON'T do, a constant process by elimination and of deconstruction.. in the beginner's mind there are many possibilities, in the expert's mind there are few.. You obviously COULD control your every twitch for a set period of time if you set your mind to it but for all intents and purposes such would have absolutely no benefit other than admittedly providing confirmation to yourself that you are indeed the captain of your own ship.
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Post by laughter on May 6, 2014 15:47:13 GMT -5
I couldn't find a thread explicitly about this. Seems like it should have its own place. Here's a link to ST founder Shawn Nevins ruminating on it in TAT's Forum (props to sharon for linking to this first) -- he has you step through a simple experiment to test it: There are some interesting wikipedia entries on the subject as well: Neuroscience of Free will -- this points to the Libet experiments also mentioned by Shawn. Basically, it is experimentally observable that the 'awareness' or 'felt intention' to move a finger significantly lagged the brain activity required to move a finger. Perpetually behind the game, folks. But this is not conclusive. compatibilism -- This is the idea that free will and determinism can both be the case. The idea is as Schopenhauer said: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills." The wikipedia entry continues "in other words, although an agent may often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is determined." Dennet argues that free will is essential for the development of morality. That last sentence makes sense to me -- will or motivation is a result of conditioning. It is possible to influence the conditioning that creates the swamp where apparent decisions arise from. But I find a lot of this confusing. In terms of the science, how can the measurement of when the choice was made vs. the perception of the choice being made ever include an accurate disentanglement of the two? How can the investigator ever be sure that his definition of the event of perception doesn't involve some delay between the pattern of neural activity that is the root cause of the perception and that event?
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on May 6, 2014 15:51:33 GMT -5
btw - I think you're doing a bang up job on the volition debate .. making all the right choices .. and you deserve all the credit....
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Post by laughter on May 6, 2014 15:55:05 GMT -5
btw - I think you're doing a bang up job on the volition debate .. making all the right choices .. and you deserve all the credit.... Admit it, you just got a problem with guys named Poindexter!
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Post by tzujanli on May 6, 2014 21:06:25 GMT -5
There is a balance of movements, processes, thoughts, and choices some of which are self-controlled and some of which are beyond our control.. when i choose to swim underwater i also choose to hold my breath.. i may not choose to grow my hair, but i do choose if and when to cut it.. i choose to understand the existence i experience, from a holistic and practical perspective, a collaborative effort with the independently functioning version of 'me' collaborating with the collective whole 'me', resulting in an evolving discovery of existence experiencing itself..
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Post by stardustpilgrim on May 6, 2014 22:14:18 GMT -5
I couldn't find a thread explicitly about this. Seems like it should have its own place. Here's a link to ST founder Shawn Nevins ruminating on it in TAT's Forum (props to sharon for linking to this first) -- he has you step through a simple experiment to test it: There are some interesting wikipedia entries on the subject as well: Neuroscience of Free will -- this points to the Libet experiments also mentioned by Shawn. Basically, it is experimentally observable that the 'awareness' or 'felt intention' to move a finger significantly lagged the brain activity required to move a finger. Perpetually behind the game, folks. But this is not conclusive. compatibilism -- This is the idea that free will and determinism can both be the case. The idea is as Schopenhauer said: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills." The wikipedia entry continues "in other words, although an agent may often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is determined." Dennet argues that free will is essential for the development of morality. That last sentence makes sense to me -- will or motivation is a result of conditioning. It is possible to influence the conditioning that creates the swamp where apparent decisions arise from. But I find a lot of this confusing. In terms of the science, how can the measurement of when the choice was made vs. the perception of the choice being made ever include an accurate disentanglement of the two? How can the investigator ever be sure that his definition of the event of perception doesn't involve some delay between the pattern of neural activity that is the root cause of the perception and that event? I don't doubt that Mr. Libet's experiments are accurate. His mistake is to consider that the conscious mind as self. Self is the conscious mind plus the unconscious, subconscious(psychological) and unconscious neurological processing. So the fact that the conscious mind is behind the neurological processing by a second or so means very little. sdp
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Post by teetown on May 6, 2014 22:20:01 GMT -5
For a fascinating read, check out Thinking Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman. I recall that he talks about several experiments like the one Shawn mentions, over the past 30 years that show that most decisions are made unconsciously, as that 'system' is much faster at making decisions. That unconscious system has no sense of 'I' invested in it, yet when reflecting on a previous decision, subjects will take credit for the decision and create irrational reasons for why they made those decisions.
Funny that Shawn takes the skeptical side to the "no chooser" debate, since Gary Weber talks about a lot of this stuff too, and Shawn recently put a favorable review of Gary on his site.
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Post by enigma on May 6, 2014 22:36:19 GMT -5
Surely it's obvious that the arm moves when you intend to move it, and not when you command it or imagine it. It may be the first step in walking away and calling it BS for many (since it is). Ironically, one must imagine one is NOT in control of the arm in order to have this sense of not being able to control it. Non-volition is not about the inability to choose, but rather the inability to choose what one chooses. Yes. So much for the arm/table experiment.
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Post by enigma on May 6, 2014 22:37:28 GMT -5
Since we don't decide to decide, we don't have free will. And even if we did decide to decide, did we actually decide that? Dunno. I can't decide.
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Post by enigma on May 6, 2014 22:39:01 GMT -5
We DO control our movements, but not explicitly only implicitly, in terms of desire and intent. We absolutely control what we DON'T do, a constant process by elimination and of deconstruction.. in the beginner's mind there are many possibilities, in the expert's mind there are few.. You obviously COULD control your every twitch for a set period of time if you set your mind to it but for all intents and purposes such would have absolutely no benefit other than admittedly providing confirmation to yourself that you are indeed the captain of your own ship. Irrelevant to the issue of volition.
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Post by enigma on May 6, 2014 22:46:10 GMT -5
I couldn't find a thread explicitly about this. Seems like it should have its own place. Here's a link to ST founder Shawn Nevins ruminating on it in TAT's Forum (props to sharon for linking to this first) -- he has you step through a simple experiment to test it: There are some interesting wikipedia entries on the subject as well: Neuroscience of Free will -- this points to the Libet experiments also mentioned by Shawn. Basically, it is experimentally observable that the 'awareness' or 'felt intention' to move a finger significantly lagged the brain activity required to move a finger. Perpetually behind the game, folks. But this is not conclusive. compatibilism -- This is the idea that free will and determinism can both be the case. The idea is as Schopenhauer said: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills." The wikipedia entry continues "in other words, although an agent may often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is determined." Dennet argues that free will is essential for the development of morality. That last sentence makes sense to me -- will or motivation is a result of conditioning. It is possible to influence the conditioning that creates the swamp where apparent decisions arise from. But I find a lot of this confusing. In terms of the science, how can the measurement of when the choice was made vs. the perception of the choice being made ever include an accurate disentanglement of the two? How can the investigator ever be sure that his definition of the event of perception doesn't involve some delay between the pattern of neural activity that is the root cause of the perception and that event? Oddly, the same thought occurred to me today, before this thread was ever started.
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Post by enigma on May 6, 2014 23:13:41 GMT -5
In terms of the science, how can the measurement of when the choice was made vs. the perception of the choice being made ever include an accurate disentanglement of the two? How can the investigator ever be sure that his definition of the event of perception doesn't involve some delay between the pattern of neural activity that is the root cause of the perception and that event? I don't doubt that Mr. Libet's experiments are accurate. His mistake is to consider that the conscious mind as self. Self is the conscious mind plus the unconscious, subconscious(psychological) and unconscious neurological processing. So the fact that the conscious mind is behind the neurological processing by a second or so means very little. sdp It means a great deal if there is no conscious control regardless of how the self is defined.
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Post by enigma on May 6, 2014 23:15:55 GMT -5
For a fascinating read, check out Thinking Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman. I recall that he talks about several experiments like the one Shawn mentions, over the past 30 years that show that most decisions are made unconsciously, as that 'system' is much faster at making decisions. That unconscious system has no sense of 'I' invested in it, yet when reflecting on a previous decision, subjects will take credit for the decision and create irrational reasons for why they made those decisions. Funny that Shawn takes the skeptical side to the "no chooser" debate, since Gary Weber talks about a lot of this stuff too, and Shawn recently put a favorable review of Gary on his site. Well, he had no choice but to do that, right?
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