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Post by someNOTHING! on Feb 8, 2018 20:32:37 GMT -5
Identification with the false self is the condition needed for having to search for the labeled True Self Not even Batman could riddle his way out of that one. ![:D](//storage.proboards.com/forum/images/smiley/grin.png) Glad there was a nugget in there.
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Post by enigma on Feb 9, 2018 12:50:36 GMT -5
[quote timestamp="1517998327" author=" andrew" source="/post/43 3459/thread"]If it was the case that pain is just sensation, the baby would be no different to an AI bot.You mean in terms of how pain is interpreted? Maybe so. That's fine. It becomes an alert that something in the body requires attention. That all it needs to be. I mean that even in a baby there is a primitive 'me' structure that the AI robot doesn't have, so apparently an AI robot can be programmed to respond to a 'sensation', but I still wouldn't classify the sensation and response as an 'actual' experience of pain because the primitive 'me' structure (or sense of self) is absent. Whereas the baby is 'actually' experiencing pain, because the primitive 'me' structure is present (just as it is in animals). [/b]unconscious sense of itself, and therefore although pain is experienced differently by babies (to older humans), there is still an apparent sufferer. [/quote]A sense of self is not a 'me' structure in the mind. A sense of self does not lead to suffering. Your premise was that ''pain is just sensation until it is attached to a 'me' structure and it becomes suffering''. I'm saying that GIVEN that premise, the baby must be suffering because there IS a 'me' structure, just not an abstract conceptual structure.
We are moved to comfort simply because we believe it is suffering because it is acting like we do when we suffer. I'm suggesting we're missing something about how suffering happens. [/quote] Well it would be interesting to see if one would be moved to provide comfort to an AI robot when they demonstrated that they were responding to pain. [/quote] ------------------------------------------ Andy:Your premise was that ''pain is just sensation until it is attached to a 'me' structure and it becomes suffering''. I'm saying that GIVEN that premise, the baby must be suffering because there IS a 'me' structure, just not an abstract conceptual structure. And I'm saying there isn't a 'me' structure in the infant. Andy:Well it would be interesting to see if one would be moved to provide comfort to an AI robot when they demonstrated that they were responding to pain. Not if you knew it was a robot and that robots can't feel pain. What did I miss?
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Post by enigma on Feb 9, 2018 12:54:50 GMT -5
Of course babies have needs, as do the animals in the wild. That doesn't imply they suffer. I would be interested in the experiments that prove they do. To start with, I'm not sure how subjective suffering is determined objectively. I'm not sure either, but if the body is designed with a survival instinct, then 'suffering' could be the body-mind's way of saying, 'there is a problem that is disrupting my welfare'. Does a baby send off a 'there is a problem that is disrupting my welfare' signal? Well, when a baby is screaming for half an hour, I would say that is a 'there is a problem that is disrupting my welfare' signal. Pain is the 'welfare' signal. Pain and suffering are not the same. That's the whole point of this discussion.
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Post by enigma on Feb 9, 2018 12:58:59 GMT -5
There's no authentic self either. The only self that shows up in a human is an imagined one, and a child has to be able to form some deceptively complex concepts in order to form one. Takes a couple of years. What I see you suggesting here is 'no self' rather than 'authentic self' and I'm alright with that, but I would say the 'imagined self' begins to really take shape at the age of two/three, but is still present before that. An 'imagined self' isn't a 'self that is being imagined', it is the apparent imaginer. An imagined self is a self that's being imagined. It's a Tenkatology, and Tenkatologys can't be argued.
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Post by andrew on Feb 9, 2018 13:04:18 GMT -5
You mean in terms of how pain is interpreted? Maybe so. That's fine. It becomes an alert that something in the body requires attention. That all it needs to be. I mean that even in a baby there is a primitive 'me' structure that the AI robot doesn't have, so apparently an AI robot can be programmed to respond to a 'sensation', but I still wouldn't classify the sensation and response as an 'actual' experience of pain because the primitive 'me' structure (or sense of self) is absent. Whereas the baby is 'actually' experiencing pain, because the primitive 'me' structure is present (just as it is in animals). [/b]unconscious sense of itself, and therefore although pain is experienced differently by babies (to older humans), there is still an apparent sufferer. [/quote]A sense of self is not a 'me' structure in the mind. A sense of self does not lead to suffering. Your premise was that ''pain is just sensation until it is attached to a 'me' structure and it becomes suffering''. I'm saying that GIVEN that premise, the baby must be suffering because there IS a 'me' structure, just not an abstract conceptual structure.
We are moved to comfort simply because we believe it is suffering because it is acting like we do when we suffer. I'm suggesting we're missing something about how suffering happens. [/quote] Well it would be interesting to see if one would be moved to provide comfort to an AI robot when they demonstrated that they were responding to pain. [/quote] ------------------------------------------ Andy:Your premise was that ''pain is just sensation until it is attached to a 'me' structure and it becomes suffering''. I'm saying that GIVEN that premise, the baby must be suffering because there IS a 'me' structure, just not an abstract conceptual structure. And I'm saying there isn't a 'me' structure in the infant. Andy:Well it would be interesting to see if one would be moved to provide comfort to an AI robot when they demonstrated that they were responding to pain. Not if you knew it was a robot and that robots can't feel pain. What did I miss? [/quote] Well, you are missing the point that there is a 'me' structure in a baby, and this 'me' structure is the difference between AI robot and intelligent being. Apparently the AI robot can artificially 'experience' sensation, such as pain. They can be given artificial sensors apparently.
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Post by andrew on Feb 9, 2018 13:07:19 GMT -5
I'm not sure either, but if the body is designed with a survival instinct, then 'suffering' could be the body-mind's way of saying, 'there is a problem that is disrupting my welfare'. Does a baby send off a 'there is a problem that is disrupting my welfare' signal? Well, when a baby is screaming for half an hour, I would say that is a 'there is a problem that is disrupting my welfare' signal. Pain is the 'welfare' signal. Pain and suffering are not the same. That's the whole point of this discussion. A screaming baby is eliciting a signal of 'there is a problem that is disrupting my welfare'. I would say that pain disrupts welfare to the extent that pain comes with a suffering component. If pain had no suffering component to it at all, well pain wouldn't be a problem would it, and we would have no reason to avoid stepping on an upturned plug. Would you say the only reason babies scream is out of pain? If they are hungry or thirsty, is that pain? If they have poop in their pants, is that pain? If they are tired, is that pain? If they want their toy, is that pain?
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Post by andrew on Feb 9, 2018 13:09:42 GMT -5
What I see you suggesting here is 'no self' rather than 'authentic self' and I'm alright with that, but I would say the 'imagined self' begins to really take shape at the age of two/three, but is still present before that. An 'imagined self' isn't a 'self that is being imagined', it is the apparent imaginer. An imagined self is a self that's being imagined. It's a Tenkatology, and Tenkatologys can't be argued. I'm suggesting the idea of an 'imagined self' is a bit misconceived because the imaginer and the self are the same.
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Post by someNOTHING! on Feb 9, 2018 14:07:37 GMT -5
An imagined self is a self that's being imagined. It's a Tenkatology, and Tenkatologys can't be argued. I'm suggesting the idea of an 'imagined self' is a bit misconceived because the imaginer and the self are the same. Perhaps it would help to clarify what we refer to as self. Poke on it, distinguish finer detail, throw out older pre-conceptions and find a new page. Here's a definition (compliments of The Goog) to provide context.... selfa person's essential being that distinguishes them from others, especially considered as the object of introspection or reflexive action. "our alienation from our true selves" synonyms: ego, I, oneself, persona, person, identity, character, personality, psyche, soul, spirit, mind, (inner) being "listen to your inner self"
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Post by andrew on Feb 9, 2018 14:15:53 GMT -5
I'm suggesting the idea of an 'imagined self' is a bit misconceived because the imaginer and the self are the same. Perhaps it would help to clarify what we refer to as self. Poke on it, distinguish finer detail, throw out older pre-conceptions and find a new page. Here's a definition (compliments of The Goog) to provide context.... selfa person's essential being that distinguishes them from others, especially considered as the object of introspection or reflexive action. "our alienation from our true selves" synonyms: ego, I, oneself, persona, person, identity, character, personality, psyche, soul, spirit, mind, (inner) being "listen to your inner self" I'm suggesting the self is the apparent 'one'. Also referred to as the doer, the person, the imaginer, the actor. We could also say this 'one' is a thought, hence why we might suggest that 'no self' or 'not self' is the case. And hence why, in deep sleep, or a state of samadhi, the self, person, doer, imaginer, actor, is absent.
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Post by someNOTHING! on Feb 9, 2018 14:19:33 GMT -5
Perhaps it would help to clarify what we refer to as self. Poke on it, distinguish finer detail, throw out older pre-conceptions and find a new page. Here's a definition (compliments of The Goog) to provide context.... selfa person's essential being that distinguishes them from others, especially considered as the object of introspection or reflexive action. "our alienation from our true selves" synonyms: ego, I, oneself, persona, person, identity, character, personality, psyche, soul, spirit, mind, (inner) being "listen to your inner self" I'm suggesting the self is the apparent 'one'. Also referred to as the doer, the person, the imaginer, the actor. Is that finely detailed on a newly conceived page? Appearing to what?
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Post by andrew on Feb 9, 2018 14:26:31 GMT -5
I'm suggesting the self is the apparent 'one'. Also referred to as the doer, the person, the imaginer, the actor. Is that finely detailed on a newly conceived page? Appearing to what? I edited to provide more fine detail...poked around at it for a bit longer. Consciousness.
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Post by andrew on Feb 9, 2018 14:54:36 GMT -5
To extend the point a bit...
The boundary of the idea of an 'imagined self' is the same boundary as the idea of 'false self'. They both imply an oppositional true self. In some contexts, I'm perfectly fine with the idea of speaking of a true self, but it seemed that Enigma had been previously pointing to 'no self', so to speak of there being an 'imagined self' that happens at a certain age is a bit misconceived.
In the sense that Enigma was talking (he was challenging sdp's words about 'true self'), either we can say no-self is the case, or we can say that the apparent self is present from day one. Either way is saying the same thing really.
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Post by someNOTHING! on Feb 9, 2018 15:18:35 GMT -5
synonyms: ego, I, oneself, persona, person, identity, character, personality, psyche, soul, spirit, mind, (inner) being "listen to your inner self" I'm suggesting the self is the apparent 'one'. Also referred to as the doer, the person, the imaginer, the actor. We could also say this 'one' is a thought, hence why we might suggest that 'no self' or 'not self' is the case. And hence why, in deep sleep, or a state of samadhi, the self, person, doer, imaginer, actor, is absent. [/quote] I edited to provide more fine detail...poked around at it for a bit longer. Consciousness. Ok, I'll focus on what you've written here. In how I'd use the analogy, the "actor" would be primary; whereas, the person would be the role or appearance of which one becomes conscious of (i.e., secondary). As such, the actor imagines the whole drama of selves, which are only appearances. Problem is, "actor" kind of has a selvy feel to it. But, perhaps this might help.
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Post by enigma on Feb 9, 2018 15:40:07 GMT -5
Of course babies have needs, as do the animals in the wild. That doesn't imply they suffer. I would be interested in the experiments that prove they do. To start with, I'm not sure how subjective suffering is determined objectively.Then how can we be sure those beings don't/can't suffer? I'm guessing your answer may be along the lines of what you said earlier here, about "reversing the process of suffering …", in which case I assume you're doing that, and applying it to a perception about the potential capacity of babies, and animals (i.e. their capacity for self-awareness). Putting aside the assumption there for the moment, presumably this is done through a process of observation, and application, so at the risk on going off on a tangent, how can we do that in this instance accurately, but not when it comes to determining the perceptual capacity of other beings, (i.e. in the others as perceivers scenario)? Maybe we can agree that, in general, suffering is formed in the mind rather than in the senses. Then the issue becomes, what sort of mental processes and structures are required to form suffering. I think the only controversial thing I'm saying here is that it requires a structure of self identification and that the infant cannot form that structure. We can notice that our own suffering is always about 'me'. Even compassion and empathy are solidly grounded in the 'me'. If it is not happening to the 'me', it cannot be my subjective suffering that we're talking about. As for what it takes to be able to form that 'me' structure, the concept of separation must be viscerally groked, and the conclusion derived that the world is happening to a 'me', involving the projection of 'my' situation into the past, generally concluding that this should not have happened, and projecting it into the future imagining that it may not have an ending. This is suffering, and it's asking a lot of an infant that has just begun to make an association between feeling hungry, and that hunger being abated by events that follow. That process runs very smoothly for the adult because we've had so much practice. An animal can feel pain without suffering. This is a critical insight that can turn a seeker's focus away from trying to fix his world and toward trying to fix how he sees his world.
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Post by enigma on Feb 9, 2018 15:50:30 GMT -5
Of course babies have needs, as do the animals in the wild. That doesn't imply they suffer. I would be interested in the experiments that prove they do. To start with, I'm not sure how subjective suffering is determined objectively. I think the difference between animals in the wild and humans is that humans are self aware. It's this self awareness that the humans build a self identity around, which animals can't do. I wouldn't define suffering as a feeling of separation. I would say suffering is any feeling from which one struggles to escape. From my perspective, your definition is a bit problematic because it may contain a hidden Katie trap. Well, pretending to not struggle is a different issue, but yes, defining suffering is always problematic because it is subjectively experienced.
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