|
Post by laughter on Sept 12, 2013 7:14:57 GMT -5
The author is an idiot. Solipsism should be understood with the qualia model that I've developed and posted here last year. Solipsism is the most elegant and consistent solution for the philosophical problem of existence. From the the pre-Soccratic Greek Gorgias: 1. Nothing exists. 2. Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it. 3. Even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it can't be communicated to others. The obvious reason to avoid solipsism is the conclusion that other minds don't exist, and according to this source, that's a sort of problem that philosopher's have been working around over the millenia. For example, the idea is that Descartes avoided it through the medium of God, while later authors with a secular approach had to find a different solution, such as: 3. The Argument from Analogy
What then of my knowledge of the minds of others? On Locke’s view there can be only one answer: since what I know directly is the existence and contents of my own mind, it follows that my knowledge of the minds of others, if I am to be said to possess such knowledge at all, has to be indirect and analogical, an inference from my own case. This is the so-called “argument from analogy” for other minds, which empiricist philosophers in particular who accept the Cartesian account of consciousness generally assume as a mechanism for avoiding solipsism. (Compare J. S. Mill, William James, Bertrand Russell, and A. J. Ayer).
So how does solipsism emerge from the QM? Does this emergence arrive at the allegedly solipsistic conclusion that other minds don't exist or some other conclusion from which that can be either deduced or inferred? The (albeit simplistic and likely naive) model that I would state here looks at the whole problem from the outside looking in. If the physical world is explored using the scientific method based on the assumption of an objective reality shared by separate individuals eventually the assumption is broken. While the popular alternative to this view is a unitive shared consciousness from which our individuated subjective physical states emerge, I find the reliance on the metaphysical notion of consciousness as an emergent physical phenomenon to suffer from a basis rooted in an unresolved tangled hierarchy. Instead, while objectivity must be abandoned for lack of basis and there is no appearance that can sufficiently serve as a basis for the assumption of identity, that there is something, rather than nothing is as self-evident as the multiplicity of unique perspective on whatever that something is. ie: solipsism is turned inside out in that there is no I but there is apparently a you. In this, reliance on the concepts of awareness or consciousness is shed. Similar to Descartes, I would resort to an expression of paradox and simply refer to ineffability for lack of a resolution to it, but I wouldn't bother calling that God.
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Sept 12, 2013 8:57:56 GMT -5
The author is an idiot. Solipsism should be understood with the qualia model that I've developed and posted here last year. Solipsism is the most elegant and consistent solution for the philosophical problem of existence. From the the pre-Soccratic Greek Gorgias: 1. Nothing exists. 2. Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it. 3. Even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it can't be communicated to others. The obvious reason to avoid solipsism is the conclusion that other minds don't exist, and according to this source, that's a sort of problem that philosopher's have been working around over the millenia. For example, the idea is that Descartes avoided it through the medium of God, while later authors with a secular approach had to find a different solution, such as: 3. The Argument from Analogy
What then of my knowledge of the minds of others? On Locke’s view there can be only one answer: since what I know directly is the existence and contents of my own mind, it follows that my knowledge of the minds of others, if I am to be said to possess such knowledge at all, has to be indirect and analogical, an inference from my own case. This is the so-called “argument from analogy” for other minds, which empiricist philosophers in particular who accept the Cartesian account of consciousness generally assume as a mechanism for avoiding solipsism. (Compare J. S. Mill, William James, Bertrand Russell, and A. J. Ayer).
So how does solipsism emerge from the QM? Does this emergence arrive at the allegedly solipsistic conclusion that other minds don't exist or some other conclusion from which that can be either deduced or inferred? The (albeit simplistic and likely naive) model that I would state here looks at the whole problem from the outside looking in. If the physical world is explored using the scientific method based on the assumption of an objective reality shared by separate individuals eventually the assumption is broken. While the popular alternative to this view is a unitive shared consciousness from which our individuated subjective physical states emerge, I find the reliance on the metaphysical notion of consciousness as an emergent physical phenomenon to suffer from a basis rooted in an unresolved tangled hierarchy. Instead, while objectivity must be abandoned for lack of basis and there is no appearance that can sufficiently serve as a basis for the assumption of identity, that there is something, rather than nothing is as self-evident as the multiplicity of unique perspective on whatever that something is. ie: solipsism is turned inside out in that there is no I but there is apparently a you. In this, reliance on the concepts of awareness or consciousness is shed. Similar to Descartes, I would resort to an expression of paradox and simply refer to ineffability for lack of a resolution to it, but I wouldn't bother calling that God. Yes. I thought 'I know that I know nothing' (attributed to Socrates) got it right. It's a paradox, teetering on 'know.' Know is used in two ways: (1)knowing in the sense of knowledge -- nothing can be known, in that not a single thing/object can be known; and (2) yet 'knowing' is happening -- here knowing is just a verb and has no object really. Last night I was reading a cool book on artificial intelligence called The Most Human Human. The author was waxing on about purpose and existentialism v. christianity. Purpose, in the christian model, is something god-given to be discovered. In existentialism there is no purpose; it must be invented/created, or not. I prefer the existentialist view, and the several points Gorgias made as well. Now for a mid morning snack.
|
|
|
Post by ???????? ???????????? on Sept 12, 2013 15:32:31 GMT -5
The author is an idiot. Solipsism should be understood with the qualia model that I've developed and posted here last year. Solipsism is the most elegant and consistent solution for the philosophical problem of existence. From the the pre-Soccratic Greek Gorgias: 1. Nothing exists. 2. Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it. 3. Even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it can't be communicated to others. Doesn't make sense to me.
|
|
|
Post by ???????? ???????????? on Sept 12, 2013 15:39:33 GMT -5
The obvious reason to avoid solipsism is the conclusion that other minds don't exist, and according to this source, that's a sort of problem that philosopher's have been working around over the millenia. For example, the idea is that Descartes avoided it through the medium of God, while later authors with a secular approach had to find a different solution, such as: The article is discussing a Cartesian strawman version of solipsism that my view (solipsism based on qualia model) has little to do with. There is also a lot of sophistry going on and several blatant blunders. Cartesian solipsism is stupid and I would never defend it. In my version the "ipse" in solipsism should be replaced by some latin equivalent of "qualia". Maybe Beingist is interested in inventing the gramatically correct latin term. The solution is that the QM operates from a different definition of "real", where reality is by definition the same as the entirety of qualia, which are by definition only now and only "mine". A quale that is not present now, or is present only in someone else, is not a quale in the first place. This conclusion is made by considering that the definition of evidence is that it must come to us experientially. Evidence that we don't experience first-hand isn't evidence at all. This fact detemines all further considerations about the nature of reality/existence. Then we by definition can't possibly make the case that reality/existence could be anything other than qualia. There is no evidence at all of anything that is not a quale, and at the same time all evidence that is available to us comes in the form of qualia. No, it will never be broken. The bad news is that once "the objective world out there" is assumed at the start of the logical equation, there is nothing that follows that would prove the assumption wrong. In the same way as you can never prove that there isn't an invisible fairy always behind you, so quick and smart that it always escapes detection. The good news is that the "physical assumption" plays no role in the scientific method, it's just a de facto inconsequential belief and its strongest expression with regard to science is that it is used to rewrite evidence from a "there is a quale that suggests so and so" into a "we have information from an external objective world that so and so"... the evidence is still the same, how you write it doesn't actually affect how you insert it into the logical equation determined by the scientific method. The many unique perspectives are not self-evident at all. Paradox simply means that you've made a mistake in your thinking process.
|
|
|
Post by laughter on Sept 12, 2013 16:57:15 GMT -5
The obvious reason to avoid solipsism is the conclusion that other minds don't exist, and according to this source, that's a sort of problem that philosopher's have been working around over the millenia. For example, the idea is that Descartes avoided it through the medium of God, while later authors with a secular approach had to find a different solution, such as: The article is discussing a Cartesian strawman version of solipsism that my view (solipsism based on qualia model) has little to do with. There is also a lot of sophistry going on and several blatant blunders. Cartesian solipsism is stupid and I would never defend it. In my version the "ipse" in solipsism should be replaced by some latin equivalent of "qualia". Maybe Beingist is interested in inventing the gramatically correct latin term. Fair enough on the Cartesian straw man. O.k, I take the gist of what you're saying here as Sol Ips ism sould read My Qualia Reality? I'd be interested to hear your summary of historical solipsism and what it means to you. Do you agree with this notion that solipsism has no way to account for the existence of other minds? The solution is that the QM operates from a different definition of "real", where reality is by definition the same as the entirety of qualia, which are by definition only now and only "mine". A quale that is not present now, or is present only in someone else, is not a quale in the first place. This conclusion is made by considering that the definition of evidence is that it must come to us experientially. Evidence that we don't experience first-hand isn't evidence at all. This fact detemines all further considerations about the nature of reality/existence. Then we by definition can't possibly make the case that reality/existence could be anything other than qualia. There is no evidence at all of anything that is not a quale, and at the same time all evidence that is available to us comes in the form of qualia. I'm interested in relating QM to the "other-mind problem". What is the relationship, if any, between an idea and a quale? How does the model account for my reading your words that I'm replying to? No, it will never be broken. I can agree to disagree with you on that point and don't see a reason to re-hash that discussion but will if you want to. The bad news is that once "the objective world out there" is assumed at the start of the logical equation, there is nothing that follows that would prove the assumption wrong. In the same way as you can never prove that there isn't an invisible fairy always behind you, so quick and smart that it always escapes detection. Aye, and in this, our disagreement on the last point is moot. The good news is that the "physical assumption" plays no role in the scientific method, Right, not in the method, which is common to all science, just in the pre-Copenhagen science of Physics. it's just a de facto inconsequential belief and its strongest expression with regard to science is that it is used to rewrite evidence from a "there is a quale that suggests so and so" into a "we have information from an external objective world that so and so"... the evidence is still the same, how you write it doesn't actually affect how you insert it into the logical equation determined by the scientific method. Without adopting your view on this with regard to the consequence of the assumption, I see what you mean. The many unique perspectives are not self-evident at all. Without perspective there is an absence of the object of perspective and a perspective is by definition unique. Said another way: A quale that is not present now, or is present only in someone else, is not a quale in the first place. Either our quales of red are not the same or we are the same. I don't subscribe to the latter and my guess is neither do you. Paradox simply means that you've made a mistake in your thinking process. (** muttley snicker **)
|
|
|
Post by laughter on Sept 13, 2013 2:06:32 GMT -5
From the the pre-Soccratic Greek Gorgias: 1. Nothing exists. 2. Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it. 3. Even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it can't be communicated to others. The obvious reason to avoid solipsism is the conclusion that other minds don't exist, and according to this source, that's a sort of problem that philosopher's have been working around over the millenia. For example, the idea is that Descartes avoided it through the medium of God, while later authors with a secular approach had to find a different solution, such as: 3. The Argument from Analogy
What then of my knowledge of the minds of others? On Locke’s view there can be only one answer: since what I know directly is the existence and contents of my own mind, it follows that my knowledge of the minds of others, if I am to be said to possess such knowledge at all, has to be indirect and analogical, an inference from my own case. This is the so-called “argument from analogy” for other minds, which empiricist philosophers in particular who accept the Cartesian account of consciousness generally assume as a mechanism for avoiding solipsism. (Compare J. S. Mill, William James, Bertrand Russell, and A. J. Ayer).
So how does solipsism emerge from the QM? Does this emergence arrive at the allegedly solipsistic conclusion that other minds don't exist or some other conclusion from which that can be either deduced or inferred? The (albeit simplistic and likely naive) model that I would state here looks at the whole problem from the outside looking in. If the physical world is explored using the scientific method based on the assumption of an objective reality shared by separate individuals eventually the assumption is broken. While the popular alternative to this view is a unitive shared consciousness from which our individuated subjective physical states emerge, I find the reliance on the metaphysical notion of consciousness as an emergent physical phenomenon to suffer from a basis rooted in an unresolved tangled hierarchy. Instead, while objectivity must be abandoned for lack of basis and there is no appearance that can sufficiently serve as a basis for the assumption of identity, that there is something, rather than nothing is as self-evident as the multiplicity of unique perspective on whatever that something is. ie: solipsism is turned inside out in that there is no I but there is apparently a you. In this, reliance on the concepts of awareness or consciousness is shed. Similar to Descartes, I would resort to an expression of paradox and simply refer to ineffability for lack of a resolution to it, but I wouldn't bother calling that God. Yes. I thought 'I know that I know nothing' (attributed to Socrates) got it right. It's a paradox, teetering on 'know.' Know is used in two ways: (1)knowing in the sense of knowledge -- nothing can be known, in that not a single thing/object can be known; and (2) yet 'knowing' is happening -- here knowing is just a verb and has no object really. Yes ... it's an interesting point to keep an eye out around here: does your correspondent understand this distinction? Last night I was reading a cool book on artificial intelligence called The Most Human Human. The author was waxing on about purpose and existentialism v. christianity. Purpose, in the christian model, is something god-given to be discovered. In existentialism there is no purpose; it must be invented/created, or not. I prefer the existentialist view, and the several points Gorgias made as well. Now for a mid morning snack. Purpose is yet another great point of ATA and I'd bet that there's more than one koan centered on it. The mind either has to make one up or come face to face with the fact that it was to make one up ... while what the mind isn't just (** smiles **).
|
|
|
Post by ???????? ???????????? on Sept 13, 2013 6:27:50 GMT -5
Do you agree with this notion that solipsism has no way to account for the existence of other minds? That's why it's called solipsism. There is no other-mind problem because there are no other minds, there isn't even my mind, in QM there is only reality. This was the Achilles' heel of the first version of QM, and maybe any model out there that is trying to give an account of reality. My solution for this is still the same as the one I laid out in the Jed thread. Basically the QM is just an application of if-then logic, if we assume so-and-so then the QM is true. So there is no relationship between quale and idea. I say that even evidence itself is actually not invariant, evidence can be anything, what makes something into evidence is that we attach the word "evidence" to it, so that it is prioritized against other items in the context of our logic. This also accounts for "what if" games, where we just say "what if we had such and such evidence", then if it turns out that if we had such evidence, then our models would be consistent we investigate reality to look for that evidence - this is what we do when we make theories and try to verify them experimentally, i.e. we look for ways to justify us to attach the word "evidence" to the item needed to make our model consistent. So I sacrifice the big project, i.e. the hunt for the invariant truth that is true regardless of whatever ifs. The gain is that the idea/quale paradox is gone. But I wouldn't call it a compromise, I say that if-then logic is what we have always already done anyways, we just wanted it to be more than it really was. I don't see your point.
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Sept 13, 2013 8:27:51 GMT -5
From the the pre-Soccratic Greek Gorgias: 1. Nothing exists. 2. Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it. 3. Even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it can't be communicated to others. Doesn't make sense to me. 1. There isn't really any thing. There's just qualia. 2. Assume for a moment that there was some thing other than qualia. Qualia is merely perception of something that exists elsewhere, for example. Because there is a perceptual filter, there is nothing that can truly be known about that other thing. 3. Assume for a moment that the perceptual filter happens to be entirely accurate in representing this other assumed thing. The very act of trying to articulate what is percieved bastardizes the essence of those perceptions/that thing.
|
|
|
Post by ???????? ???????????? on Sept 13, 2013 8:37:23 GMT -5
Doesn't make sense to me. 1. There isn't really any thing. There's just qualia. 2. Assume for a moment that there was some thing other than qualia. Qualia is merely perception of something that exists elsewhere, for example. Because there is a perceptual filter, there is nothing that can truly be known about that other thing. 3. Assume for a moment that the perceptual filter happens to be entirely accurate in representing this other assumed thing. The very act of trying to articulate what is percieved bastardizes the essence of those perceptions/that thing. Gorgias didn't say "There isn't really any thing. There's just qualia.", he also didn't say "no thing exists", he said "nothing exists".
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Sept 13, 2013 8:40:18 GMT -5
1. There isn't really any thing. There's just qualia. 2. Assume for a moment that there was some thing other than qualia. Qualia is merely perception of something that exists elsewhere, for example. Because there is a perceptual filter, there is nothing that can truly be known about that other thing. 3. Assume for a moment that the perceptual filter happens to be entirely accurate in representing this other assumed thing. The very act of trying to articulate what is percieved bastardizes the essence of those perceptions/that thing. Gorgias didn't say "There isn't really any thing. There's just qualia.", he also didn't say "no thing exists", he said "nothing exists". True, I was just trying to make sense of it.
|
|
|
Post by laughter on Sept 13, 2013 18:23:10 GMT -5
From the the pre-Soccratic Greek Gorgias: 1. Nothing exists. 2. Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it. 3. Even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it can't be communicated to others. Doesn't make sense to me. ( _______________________________ _______________________________ )
|
|
|
Post by laughter on Sept 13, 2013 18:27:07 GMT -5
Gorgias didn't say "There isn't really any thing. There's just qualia.", he also didn't say "no thing exists", he said "nothing exists". True, I was just trying to make sense of it. If you did then you'd wind up knowing something ... back in the day my bet is that it would have been "(** Soccratic snicker **)". ... muttley snickers have, if you will notice, subtle grades of semantic that can be inferred by context, and my guess is that this one is well with you as opposed to about you ...
|
|
|
Post by laughter on Sept 13, 2013 19:06:08 GMT -5
Do you agree with this notion that solipsism has no way to account for the existence of other minds? That's why it's called solipsism. (** muttley snicker **) There is no other-mind problem because there are no other minds, there isn't even my mind, in QM there is only reality. Nice. Sincerely. Nice. What I like about the Qualia Model, at least as how I understand it, is that it takes the personal/impersonal polarity completely out of the description of reality, and thereby, in my opinion, makes a strong claim on the word. This was the Achilles' heel of the first version of QM, and maybe any model out there that is trying to give an account of reality. My solution for this is still the same as the one I laid out in the Jed thread. Basically the QM is just an application of if-then logic, if we assume so-and-so then the QM is true. So there is no relationship between quale and idea. I say that even evidence itself is actually not invariant, evidence can be anything, what makes something into evidence is that we attach the word "evidence" to it, so that it is prioritized against other items in the context of our logic. This also accounts for "what if" games, where we just say "what if we had such and such evidence", then if it turns out that if we had such evidence, then our models would be consistent we investigate reality to look for that evidence - this is what we do when we make theories and try to verify them experimentally, i.e. we look for ways to justify us to attach the word "evidence" to the item needed to make our model consistent. So I sacrifice the big project, i.e. the hunt for the invariant truth that is true regardless of whatever ifs. The gain is that the idea/quale paradox is gone. But I wouldn't call it a compromise, I say that if-then logic is what we have always already done anyways, we just wanted it to be more than it really was. I'll have to go back and read what you wrote in the Jed thread and ponder on this a bit, as I don't quite see either the paradox or the resolution to it you're suggesting, but as far as I do think that I've understood you here, thanks for the candor. Yeah, that's ok, not important -- I already admitted that the model I laid out was both simplistic and likely naive. I'll offer the excuse that those characteristics emerged from balancing a set of trade-offs involving brevity, accessibility, complexity and my bias that any map disseminated should be distributed wrapped around a match.
|
|
|
Post by laughter on Sept 22, 2013 1:28:05 GMT -5
This was the Achilles' heel of the first version of QM, and maybe any model out there that is trying to give an account of reality. My solution for this is still the same as the one I laid out in the Jed thread. Basically the QM is just an application of if-then logic, if we assume so-and-so then the QM is true. By "first version" do you mean the version you laid out last year or one previous to that? Do you mean to say that the addendum of "if/then" as you've described it here and as Sweet Brown constitutes the second version of QM or was what I read last year the second version? The way I read what you wrote here is that the QM is conditional on the assumption of the question of reality ... do I understand you here, did you mean to say "no question of reality, no QM"? That's how I'm making sense of this: So there is no relationship between quale and idea. ... which essentially denies reality to ideas. This is, similar to the characteristic of denying reality to minds, a facet of the model which I admire greatly. With this interpretation, it seems to me that you're using the concept of the conditional to model absence. I say that even evidence itself is actually not invariant, evidence can be anything, what makes something into evidence is that we attach the word "evidence" to it, so that it is prioritized against other items in the context of our logic. This also accounts for "what if" games, where we just say "what if we had such and such evidence", then if it turns out that if we had such evidence, then our models would be consistent we investigate reality to look for that evidence - this is what we do when we make theories and try to verify them experimentally, i.e. we look for ways to justify us to attach the word "evidence" to the item needed to make our model consistent. So I sacrifice the big project, i.e. the hunt for the invariant truth that is true regardless of whatever ifs. Right, well that seems to me a practical compromise wisely made based on a recognition about the nature of truth and absolutes. The gain is that the idea/quale paradox is gone. But I wouldn't call it a compromise, I say that if-then logic is what we have always already done anyways, we just wanted it to be more than it really was. The paradox is gone but not because it's resolved, simply because you've ignored it. In recognizing that you wanted QM to be more than it ever could be, you have, in a sense, torched it. The obvious flaw in how you've oriented quale to idea is that if there are no minds, not even yours, where did the QM come from? The only resolution to that question that I see is to accept what the neo-Advaitists like Enigma have to say on the matter of personality. Personally, I'm fine with that. Are you? You didn't create me and I didn't create you and there is no such thing as God ... and yet, here we are ... you reading my drivel, and me barely able to keep from puking at yours.
|
|
|
Post by ???????? ???????????? on Sept 22, 2013 15:54:16 GMT -5
By "first version" do you mean the version you laid out last year or one previous to that? Do you mean to say that the addendum of "if/then" as you've described it here and as Sweet Brown constitutes the second version of QM or was what I read last year the second version? Last year was version1. If/then is version2. Yes, it's conditional. I don't mean to make some tricky pointer to what is prior to the question. My reflections starts with the question, what is before it, if there is anything, is not within the scope of my reflection. No, I'm saying that within the context of my model ideas come first, and qualia are considered only in a conceptual sense. I further defended this view by claiming that actually "evidence" is not what we intuitively think it is. "Evidence" is simply an item to which we attach the word "evidence", so that it is prioritized against other items to which we don't assign the word "evidence". The paradox is resolved by understanding what we mean when we talk about qualia. Intuition claims that somehow we can address "real qualia" and that they are a challenge for conceptual thinking, but actually when we reason about qualia then only on a conceptual basis. Doesn't matter where it came from. The mind is like a computer, it has access only to ideas and performs its if/then operations. When it asks chicken/egg questions then it's still just doing if/then operations. What kind of answer can you possibly receive? In what way can you possibly make sense of the answer? What tools are you using to figure these things out? Doesn't matter how you spin it, it's still just if/then operations playing themselves out. If you disagree then you contradict yourself.
|
|