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Post by Reefs on Aug 22, 2013 9:58:31 GMT -5
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Post by enigma on Aug 22, 2013 10:13:44 GMT -5
Notions about how the person should change are mostly based on the idea that a person becomes enlightened. A more betterer way to look at it is that identity is withdrawn from the alleged person and it is allowed to do what it does without interference. Eggzacly what it will do is hard to say.
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Post by laughter on Aug 22, 2013 10:17:57 GMT -5
Notions about how the person should change are mostly based on the idea that a person becomes enlightened. A more betterer way to look at it is that identity is withdrawn from the alleged person and it is allowed to do what it does without interference. Eggzacly what it will do is hard to say. How is compulsion operative absent the one that would be compelled? |
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Post by enigma on Aug 22, 2013 10:51:59 GMT -5
Notions about how the person should change are mostly based on the idea that a person becomes enlightened. A more betterer way to look at it is that identity is withdrawn from the alleged person and it is allowed to do what it does without interference. Eggzacly what it will do is hard to say. How is compulsion operative absent the one that would be compelled? The identity was never valid or necessary to begin with, and so withdrawing it is the withdrawal of an overlay from the conditioning, something like no longer running a particular subroutine in a program, which of course doesn't stop the program from running. The idea that the mind/body won't do stuff if there isn't identification with the mind/body is a result of the belief in the validity of that identification. What we consider to be the separate, volitional person was never more than an idea, and that idea is not particularly relevant to the functioning of the mind/body, though it does result in some stress as it interferes with the proper functioning, which we refer to as mental and physical disease. The 'one that would be compelled' is the only one there is, and it is never absent. It was, in fact, present before the mind/body was present, and will still be present after it is gone. |
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Post by zendancer on Aug 22, 2013 11:03:58 GMT -5
How is compulsion operative absent the one that would be compelled? The identity was never valid or necessary to begin with, and so withdrawing it is the withdrawal of an overlay from the conditioning, something like no longer running a particular subroutine in a program, which of course doesn't stop the program from running. The idea that the mind/body won't do stuff if there isn't identification with the mind/body is a result of the belief in the validity of that identification. What we consider to be the separate, volitional person was never more than an idea, and that idea is not particularly relevant to the functioning of the mind/body, though it does result in some stress as it interferes with the proper functioning, which we refer to as mental and physical disease. The 'one that would be compelled' is the only one there is, and it is never absent. It was, in fact, present before the mind/body was present, and will still be present after it is gone. Yup. |
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Post by laughter on Aug 22, 2013 18:32:12 GMT -5
How is compulsion operative absent the one that would be compelled? The identity was never valid or necessary to begin with, and so withdrawing it is the withdrawal of an overlay from the conditioning, something like no longer running a particular subroutine in a program, which of course doesn't stop the program from running. The idea that the mind/body won't do stuff if there isn't identification with the mind/body is a result of the belief in the validity of that identification. What we consider to be the separate, volitional person was never more than an idea, and that idea is not particularly relevant to the functioning of the mind/body, though it does result in some stress as it interferes with the proper functioning, which we refer to as mental and physical disease. The 'one that would be compelled' is the only one there is, and it is never absent. It was, in fact, present before the mind/body was present, and will still be present after it is gone. I don't disagree with anything you've said, so I have to admit that the question was based on the misconception of the "one that would be compelled"... but Niz didn't say anything about a mind/body not doing stuff. What he said is that compulsion would be absent. For example, a mind/body can eat a slice of apple pie, and in either case there was a desire for apple pie, but absent the identification with the desire there was no compulsion to act on it. If you observe someone in the events leading up to eating the pie you might get hints of compulsion, or if someone's identified with the desire they might come out and tell you if you ask ... but outwardly, at least in the description of the act, there's no discernible difference between the two cases, and the compulsion can be consciously hidden by the one so identified. So yeah, expectations about what a mind/body will do once: identity is withdrawn from the alleged person are a fallacy, but it seems to me that Niz does state an expectation about compulsion. This expectation is about the qualities of experience rather than what experiences will transpire. |
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Post by silence on Aug 22, 2013 19:14:33 GMT -5
I think Niz might have been in denial about his smoking desire.
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Post by silence on Aug 22, 2013 19:22:46 GMT -5
The idea that the mind/body won't do stuff if there isn't identification with the mind/body is a result of the belief in the validity of that identification. What we consider to be the separate, volitional person was never more than an idea, and that idea is not particularly relevant to the functioning of the mind/body, though it does result in some stress as it interferes with the proper functioning, which we refer to as mental and physical disease. The sensation that corresponds to our image of ourselves is a chronic muscular tension that has no useful function whatsoever. -Alan Watts |
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Post by topology on Aug 22, 2013 19:48:11 GMT -5
The idea that the mind/body won't do stuff if there isn't identification with the mind/body is a result of the belief in the validity of that identification. What we consider to be the separate, volitional person was never more than an idea, and that idea is not particularly relevant to the functioning of the mind/body, though it does result in some stress as it interferes with the proper functioning, which we refer to as mental and physical disease. The sensation that corresponds to our image of ourselves is a chronic muscular tension that has no useful function whatsoever. -Alan Watts Yes. |
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Post by laughter on Aug 22, 2013 20:02:13 GMT -5
I think Niz might have been in denial about his smoking desire. (** muttley snicker **) |
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Post by enigma on Aug 22, 2013 21:01:04 GMT -5
The identity was never valid or necessary to begin with, and so withdrawing it is the withdrawal of an overlay from the conditioning, something like no longer running a particular subroutine in a program, which of course doesn't stop the program from running. The idea that the mind/body won't do stuff if there isn't identification with the mind/body is a result of the belief in the validity of that identification. What we consider to be the separate, volitional person was never more than an idea, and that idea is not particularly relevant to the functioning of the mind/body, though it does result in some stress as it interferes with the proper functioning, which we refer to as mental and physical disease. The 'one that would be compelled' is the only one there is, and it is never absent. It was, in fact, present before the mind/body was present, and will still be present after it is gone. I don't disagree with anything you've said, so I have to admit that the question was based on the misconception of the "one that would be compelled"... but Niz didn't say anything about a mind/body not doing stuff. What he said is that compulsion would be absent. For example, a mind/body can eat a slice of apple pie, and in either case there was a desire for apple pie, but absent the identification with the desire there was no compulsion to act on it. If you observe someone in the events leading up to eating the pie you might get hints of compulsion, or if someone's identified with the desire they might come out and tell you if you ask ... but outwardly, at least in the description of the act, there's no discernible difference between the two cases, and the compulsion can be consciously hidden by the one so identified. So yeah, expectations about what a mind/body will do once: identity is withdrawn from the alleged person are a fallacy, but it seems to me that Niz does state an expectation about compulsion. This expectation is about the qualities of experience rather than what experiences will transpire. Yer right, the one who desires is present in the absence of the one who would be compelled. |
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Post by enigma on Aug 22, 2013 21:04:40 GMT -5
I think Niz might have been in denial about his smoking desire. He was confronted about it many times, and he just said "There is no me." It's the same thing I say to Marie when she asks "Why did you do that"?  |
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Post by enigma on Aug 22, 2013 21:07:50 GMT -5
The idea that the mind/body won't do stuff if there isn't identification with the mind/body is a result of the belief in the validity of that identification. What we consider to be the separate, volitional person was never more than an idea, and that idea is not particularly relevant to the functioning of the mind/body, though it does result in some stress as it interferes with the proper functioning, which we refer to as mental and physical disease. The sensation that corresponds to our image of ourselves is a chronic muscular tension that has no useful function whatsoever. -Alan Watts Zacklee. U.G. said something to the effect 'The body just wants you to leave it alone.' Hehe. |
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Post by Beingist on Aug 22, 2013 21:08:28 GMT -5
I think Niz might have been in denial about his smoking desire. He was confronted about it many times, and he just said "There is no me." It's the same thing I say to Marie when she asks "Why did you do that"? Q: You smoke? M: My body kept a few habits which may as well continue till it dies. There is no harm in them. |
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Post by enigma on Aug 22, 2013 21:11:19 GMT -5
He was confronted about it many times, and he just said "There is no me." It's the same thing I say to Marie when she asks "Why did you do that"? Q: You smoke? M: My body kept a few habits which may as well continue till it dies. There is no harm in them. Huh? |
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